The Malta Independent
On page 47 of the Central Bank of Malta Annual Report for 2003 chart 4.5 (reproduced herewith) is titled REAL AND NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE – INDICES FOR THE MALTESE LIRA. This adopts 1995 as the 100 index base and shows that as at the end of 2003 the real rate of exchange of the Maltese lira had overvalued itself by nearly 10% over its 1995 base.
“TheMaastricht inflation and long-term
interest criteria have been met on a sustainable basis, and there are no
indications of major misalignment in the value of the Maltese
lira.”
Arguing the virtues of maintaining a stable rate of exchange policy is understandable, but negating one’s own research presented in the same report and describing a 10% real over-valuation as giving no indication of major misalignment is negating bare-faced facts.
On page 47 of the Central Bank of Malta Annual Report for 2003 chart 4.5 (reproduced herewith) is titled REAL AND NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE – INDICES FOR THE MALTESE LIRA. This adopts 1995 as the 100 index base and shows that as at the end of 2003 the real rate of exchange of the Maltese lira had overvalued itself by nearly 10% over its 1995 base.
To quote the Central Bank of
Malta verbatim as to what this
actually means
“A rise in the Real
Effective Exchange Rate (REER), ceteris paribus, suggests a loss of price
competitiveness and vice-versa. Given
the nature of the Maltese lira exchange rate basket, movements in the Nominal
Effective Exchange Rate(NEER) are rather
contained. It is therefore movements in
relative prices that exert the major impact on the REER. The NEER rose by 0.5% during 2003. At the same time, the REER gained 1.1%, as a
decline over the first three quarters was offset by a rise towards the end of
the year, when year-on-year inflation in
Malta picked up and exceeded
inflation abroad.”
A 10% overvaluation is a major misalignment by all counts. In a
highly competitive world it makes our export product and tourism
uncompetitive. This is showing in our
dismal economic growth performance, stagnant exports, declining tourist counts,
and structural current account deficit in the balance of payments. It is not yet showing in our reserves
position but this is more due to savers’ inertia and an interest rate policy
allowing a premium over relative overseas market rates. I contend it has little
to do with an appropriate rate of exchange value for the Maltese
lira.
I am not arguing that a realignment of our rate of exchange to the
1995 base is an automatic solution to our problems. I am on record several times that such
adjustment on its own will have very short-lived benefits as it feeds further
rounds of inflation necessitating further exchange rate adjustments. But as a part of a total re-structuring
package there is ample case to be made that a re-alignment in the exchange rate
could deliver the desired results better and quicker.
I just cannot fathom therefore how the Governor in his report
declares that
“The
Arguing the virtues of maintaining a stable rate of exchange policy is understandable, but negating one’s own research presented in the same report and describing a 10% real over-valuation as giving no indication of major misalignment is negating bare-faced facts.
But the wrong assumptions in the Governor’s report go even
further. He categorically assumes that
the fact that we have so far managed to pass the
Maastricht criteria test for
inflation and long term interest means we can put our mind at rest about
continuing to adhere to such criteria even whilst addressing the fiscal deficit
and public debt in trying to bring them within the EMU
benchmarks.
If only it were that simple.
The economy is under stress from lack of flexibility, lack of efficiency,
insufficient productive investment and a general waste of resources. This is the fire under a kettle with boiling
water where the vapour is coming out of a spout in the form of excessive annual
fiscal deficit and horrendous rapid accumulation of national
debt.
We need to remove the fire from underneath the kettle by performing
real economic re-structuring along the lines of the 10 objectives I had
explained in this column in my contributions during the first quarter of this
year, and as further explained in a recent address I made at a Seminar of the
Institute of Financial Services ( full text and
presentation can be downloaded from my web-site). Otherwise as soon as we try to block the
vapour outlet from the spout of fiscal deficit the pressure will start showing
elsewhere. The pressure will come out
from the next point of least resistance in the form of higher inflation, higher
interest rates, loss of reserves and eventually a forced rate of exchange
re-alignment.
Joining the Euro is a national effort which cannot be guided by the
Central Bank alone or even by the government alone. Joining the Euro without conducting a priori
real economic restructuring will eventually put all the stress of economic
adjustment on the real economy, on growth, on employment and on general
macro-economic stability. While other
countries would score points as they use the Euro to attract investment having
undergone proper economic re-structuring prior to joining, we might have to do
the re-structuring through the Euro discipline after joining when the only
variable left at our disposal would be economic contraction of the type suffered
by communist economies when they were suddenly opened to market
forces.
The Central Bank is right in demanding urgent re-structuring. It is wrong in applauding the government for
promising to adjust the deficit by 2006 without explaining how. Applauses should be reserved for deliveries
not for promises. It is also wrong in
negating the existing misalignment in the value of the Maltese
Lira.