28th July 2006
The
Throughout the nineteen eighties the main economic problem was one of
obstinately high inflation caused by the two oil price shocks firstly in 1973/74
and then again following the Iranian revolution in 1979.
The main economic credo then was the need to iron out excessive
inflation from the system at all costs and for this purpose the monetarist
theory prevailed. This centred round the belief that there was a direct
relationship between the quantity of money in the economy and inflation, so that
if the quantity of money increased at a higher rate than the real growth of the
economy the difference would be reflected in price rises and hence growing
inflation.
This theory made some rather simplistic assumptions that it is quite
possible to actually measure the quantity of money in the economy and that such
money had a relatively constant velocity of circulation - as a two pound note that is involved in
five separate transactions could make the same function as a ten pound note that
changes hands only once.
The upshot of the monetarist theory was that interest rates had to be
allowed to go as high as necessary in order to control the quantity of money
which was allowed to grow only at a pre-set target reflecting the expected real
growth of the economy. Inflation was
truly ironed out of the system but with a considerable time lag and at the
expense of severe economic recessions throughout most of the eighties and early
nineties. Double-digit interest rates
discouraged investment and consumption, killing off demand and forcing property
prices to plummet.
I well remember the UK situation in 1992 when
property prices went so low that they did not cover the mortgage that many
borrowers were struggling to service merely to repay the interest, let alone the
capital. Negative equity in mortgages
was the rule of the day, defaults mounted and with a deteriorating loan book
which was hitting Bank’s profits the appetite for new lending disappeared
altogether, further stagnating the economy.
Given this background the obvious question that is asked is how is it
that this time round, with oil prices reaching an all time nominal high just a
whisker off seventy nine dollars per barrel and obstinately well above the
seventy dollar mark, which in real terms is not far off the peak real price hit
in 1979, high energy prices have not produced similar inflation
problems.
One could write a thesis about this giving a myriad of reasons that
in their own way contribute to this favourable state
of affairs. The fact that economies
have become much more energy efficient obviously helps.
Globalisation has meant that developed
economies are now more based on service industries that are not as energy
dependent as manufacturing, explaining why the impact has been less severe than
previously. Manufacturing has been
substantially outsourced to low cost countries, especially to
China who compensate for
increased energy inputs by lower labour costs making
it possible for the final price to remain low in spite of higher energy
costs.
Few central banks these days put much reliance on strict monetarism
and on money supply statistics in determining their interest rates
policies. Probably the ECB is the only
important Central Bank in the world which makes reference to money supply growth
in the decision making process for interest rate levels but there is no
automatic link as hitherto between the money supply growth and interest rate
levels. If there were such a strict
link in the monetarist school of thought, interest rates would be much higher
than they are, probably causing recession.
Instead we have had one of the longest economic upswings since 2001/2002
and the interest rate cycle seems already to be peaking at rather historically
low levels.
Strict monetarists would argue that Central Banks are inviting
trouble by keeping interest rates so low.
The fact that no undue retail price inflation has been caused by the
abundant liquidity they pumped into the system as a direct result of their
keeping interest rates at historically low levels, does not mean that another
type of inflation has not been created.
It is like pushing on a toothpaste tube with the cap closed; the pressure
is simply transferred.
Should Central Banks be mindful of the asset price inflation they
have created, particularly in the real estate market? Are Central Banks only responsible to
control retail inflation and they can neglect asset price inflation even if the
formation of price bubbles in property prices could risk financial instability,
as has been experienced in Japan?
The mission statement of our Central Bank states that its goal is
“to maintain price stability and to ensure a sound financial system,
thereby contributing to sustainable economic development”. The objective of retail price stability is
obvious but the objective to achieve also asset price stability is implicit in
the need to keep sustainable development and a sound financial
system.
Our property market could have reached an inflection point. Rising interest rates and increased supply
generally lead to reduced demand, stock building and eventual price
curtailment. Developers should also
bear in mind that in Malta property prices have yet
to experience a truly rising interest rate scenario. In the interest hikes of the eighties and
nineties, we were shielded by rigid exchange controls that kept local interest
rates steady. This is no longer
possible. If interest rates
internationally go up, we will have to follow suit. Moderately rising rates could produce a
healthy soft landing for our property market.
Aggressive interest rate rises could render the landing hard and
painful. However, moderate or
aggressive, it is no longer our decision.