Maltastar
Much as they try to put up a brave face on it, the result of the last local election is not lost on the Nationalist Party. Whatever interpretation one cares to give to the result, one simple fact stands out clear.` The electorate is fed up and losing faith that PN can run our domestic affairs.
The PN strategists, whose job it is to perpetuate the PN`s stay in power to protect the interest of the sectors they represent, are not stupid. They know that if they face a general election where domestic issues are allowed to take the centre stage of the political agenda. their future looks grim indeed.
`then rely on the wide media resources at its disposal to ensure that the EU issue would be the central issue and domestic affairs are dimmed to the background `
In theory they have two choices. The most logical one, you would think, would be the decelerate on the EU project and give more attention to domestic issues. In practice this option is a non-starter.` The EU project is not the switch on,` switch off type and there is at stake the great personal ambition of Prime Minister Fenech Adami to end his political career on a top note of taking Malta into full membership of the EU. There is also the question that the fiscal position is still extremely tight and the PN are still hoping for some` EU funds without which it will be difficult to re-generate the feel-good economic factor .
So in practice there remains only one option. To press harder on the accelerator of the EU project and then rely on the wide media resources at its disposal to ensure that the EU issue would be the central issue and domestic affairs are dimmed to the background.` So when it comes to measure public opinion in the forthcoming electoral tests electoral the voters will not judge on the bad PN record on the domestic front but make its choices on the EU vision of the two major parties.
This reasoning has probably put paid to the possibility of calling a general election before the referendum.` Which leaves the government with two options, namely that of holding a referendum before the general election or that of holding both together.
`So the most likely scenario is that the PN strategists will go for a referendum as early as possible in the new year which is likely to be mid-February 2003`
The latter option has considerable risks for the PN.` The biggest would be to elect a Labour Government and vote for EU membership.` Many floating voters are fed up to their ears with this government but have difficulty in following Labour`s non-membership reasoning. By voting for a Labour government and for EU membership at the same time such voters would be certifying that Labour has much better credentials to run domestic affairs and is better at negotiating favourable terms for the eventual EU membership.
So the PN`s strategists are seeing their options narrowing down to only one possibility. That of holding the referendum before the next general elections. And as the next local elections have a fixed date in March 2003 the PN strategists cannot risk another defeat as the one just suffered in the run up to the referendum.
So the most likely scenario is that the PN strategists will go for a referendum as early as possible in the new year which is likely to be mid-February 2002.` The PN strategists hope that if they carry the referendum they would have wounded Labour to a sufficient extent as to be able to perform acceptably in the March 2003 local elections,` and then proceed to a general election before the onset of Summer 2003.
This is not a risk-less strategy for the PN. If they lose the referendum and have a drumming at the local elections which would follow hot on its heels,` they will have just 8 months or so to engineer a miraculous recovery in the general elections which would then be delayed till autumn 2003.` But it is still the least risky strategy of all available options for the government and they can rely on much more resources than the MLP can hope to muster for the referendum.
With the generous funding given to MIC ( which no doubt would be again increased in` the 2003 budget) and the EU structures available to the government, including regular influential visitors who repeatedly tell us how much the grass is greener on the other side of the fence,` the MLP will be hard put to match the media challenge for the referendum.` And with the Broadcasting Authority reduced to a PN lap dog forgetting its constitutional obligation for media balance on matters of national political controversy, the PN strategists have good reason to feel confident that the EU referendum could be the lever to change their fortunes from` the certain doom which would normally await them in the following electoral tests.
There is also the shared feeling that floating voters, general unhappy with both political parties, would be more likely to vote for EU membership as a sort of imposed discipline which our political system has denied us since Mintoff achieved his life-long ambition on 31st March 1979 and started behaving like a rebel without a cause.
The PN strategists plan has only one snag. With such an imbalance of resources and with an election due within months Labour will have every reason not to lobby specifically and simply` for a no vote,` but to recommend to its faithful and sympathisers the option also not to vote or to cancel or invalidate their vote. This could check-mate the PN strategists and they would need to re-examine their options all-over again.
So you can expect many english language` editorials, as we have seen this week, explaining why Labour must not boycott the referendum.
Much as they try to put up a brave face on it, the result of the last local election is not lost on the Nationalist Party. Whatever interpretation one cares to give to the result, one simple fact stands out clear.` The electorate is fed up and losing faith that PN can run our domestic affairs.
The PN strategists, whose job it is to perpetuate the PN`s stay in power to protect the interest of the sectors they represent, are not stupid. They know that if they face a general election where domestic issues are allowed to take the centre stage of the political agenda. their future looks grim indeed.
`then rely on the wide media resources at its disposal to ensure that the EU issue would be the central issue and domestic affairs are dimmed to the background `
In theory they have two choices. The most logical one, you would think, would be the decelerate on the EU project and give more attention to domestic issues. In practice this option is a non-starter.` The EU project is not the switch on,` switch off type and there is at stake the great personal ambition of Prime Minister Fenech Adami to end his political career on a top note of taking Malta into full membership of the EU. There is also the question that the fiscal position is still extremely tight and the PN are still hoping for some` EU funds without which it will be difficult to re-generate the feel-good economic factor .
So in practice there remains only one option. To press harder on the accelerator of the EU project and then rely on the wide media resources at its disposal to ensure that the EU issue would be the central issue and domestic affairs are dimmed to the background.` So when it comes to measure public opinion in the forthcoming electoral tests electoral the voters will not judge on the bad PN record on the domestic front but make its choices on the EU vision of the two major parties.
This reasoning has probably put paid to the possibility of calling a general election before the referendum.` Which leaves the government with two options, namely that of holding a referendum before the general election or that of holding both together.
`So the most likely scenario is that the PN strategists will go for a referendum as early as possible in the new year which is likely to be mid-February 2003`
The latter option has considerable risks for the PN.` The biggest would be to elect a Labour Government and vote for EU membership.` Many floating voters are fed up to their ears with this government but have difficulty in following Labour`s non-membership reasoning. By voting for a Labour government and for EU membership at the same time such voters would be certifying that Labour has much better credentials to run domestic affairs and is better at negotiating favourable terms for the eventual EU membership.
So the PN`s strategists are seeing their options narrowing down to only one possibility. That of holding the referendum before the next general elections. And as the next local elections have a fixed date in March 2003 the PN strategists cannot risk another defeat as the one just suffered in the run up to the referendum.
So the most likely scenario is that the PN strategists will go for a referendum as early as possible in the new year which is likely to be mid-February 2002.` The PN strategists hope that if they carry the referendum they would have wounded Labour to a sufficient extent as to be able to perform acceptably in the March 2003 local elections,` and then proceed to a general election before the onset of Summer 2003.
This is not a risk-less strategy for the PN. If they lose the referendum and have a drumming at the local elections which would follow hot on its heels,` they will have just 8 months or so to engineer a miraculous recovery in the general elections which would then be delayed till autumn 2003.` But it is still the least risky strategy of all available options for the government and they can rely on much more resources than the MLP can hope to muster for the referendum.
With the generous funding given to MIC ( which no doubt would be again increased in` the 2003 budget) and the EU structures available to the government, including regular influential visitors who repeatedly tell us how much the grass is greener on the other side of the fence,` the MLP will be hard put to match the media challenge for the referendum.` And with the Broadcasting Authority reduced to a PN lap dog forgetting its constitutional obligation for media balance on matters of national political controversy, the PN strategists have good reason to feel confident that the EU referendum could be the lever to change their fortunes from` the certain doom which would normally await them in the following electoral tests.
There is also the shared feeling that floating voters, general unhappy with both political parties, would be more likely to vote for EU membership as a sort of imposed discipline which our political system has denied us since Mintoff achieved his life-long ambition on 31st March 1979 and started behaving like a rebel without a cause.
The PN strategists plan has only one snag. With such an imbalance of resources and with an election due within months Labour will have every reason not to lobby specifically and simply` for a no vote,` but to recommend to its faithful and sympathisers the option also not to vote or to cancel or invalidate their vote. This could check-mate the PN strategists and they would need to re-examine their options all-over again.
So you can expect many english language` editorials, as we have seen this week, explaining why Labour must not boycott the referendum.
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