The Malta Independent on Sunday
I have not read the
analysis report prepared for Labour Party’s national
executive by an autonomous Working Group composed of three respectable
gentlemen. I refused to read it under the aura of secrecy with which it has been
surrounded. I made my submissions to the Working Group and did not impose any
condition of confidentiality or secrecy for my submissions. I believe in
transparency. The argument that the wide distribution or publication of the
report would give ammunition to political opponents to castigate the party with,
is unconvincing and probably serves better individuals who should be called to
account rather than the party that needs to do what it needs to do to learn from
mistakes and to regenerate itself in its quest to obtain majority support at
next elections.
Furthermore
I cannot see how confidentiality could square up with making this analysis
available in good time to at least the nearly 1,000 delegates of the general
conference who are expected to make informed decisions about the party’s
emerging policies. The risk of the General Conference delegates having to take
important strategic decisions without the benefit of a proper analysis of what
went wrong for Labour, is far bigger than the risk of
leakages through enabling the delegates to be properly informed before making
their decisions for the party’s future.
So even whilst I had every opportunity to gain access to the analysis I refused to read it under these conditions. Still I can make my own analysis and assessment of why Labour lost and I put the reasons under three categories: strategic errors, tactical errors and stupid errors.
The Strategic Error was Labour’s insensible insistence that the EU issue had to be bundled with the election issue and that a referendum was unnecessary and unbinding. It is easy to point out that in January 2001 the general conference had decided to proceed accordingly. But it does well to remember that at the time the working assumption was that EU membership would be wrapped during the then current legislature and the motivation for Labour to insist that the issue be decided through an election was meant for Labour to have a chance to be in government before the issue is decided because it was clear that it would be pretty difficult for Labour to win a referendum organised by a PN government who could not be trusted to make it a level playing field for the yes and no.
The moment it became clear that execution of the EU membership project had slipped into the next legislature, Labour’s interest was to demand the separation of the EU issue from the election and for a binding referendum to be held within a very tight schedule after the election to respect the EU accession calendar. Labour did in fact belatedly switch strategy on these lines but inexplicably shot itself in the brain by incredibly demanding a 60 per cent threshold for the referendum to be binding. This gave full justification to the Prime Minister to proceed with a calendar of events which perfectly suited the PN’s interest without alienating public opinion as Labour managed to do with the 60 per cent condition.
So Labour placed themselves in the strategically destructive position where the more convincingly they criticised the government for weaknesses on the domestic front, the more they strengthened the case for EU membership and weakened Labour’s own bid for winning the election when it was clear that, by Labour’s own choice, the EU issue would gain supremacy in voters’ mind over domestic issues.
Tactically Labour messed up the referendum issue even once they decided upon it. In politics to succeed you need to make the right choices and to make them on time. Whilst in voters’ mind there was no doubt where the government stood on the referendum issue, Labour’s obsession not to disclose their position on the issue prior to the publication of the writ could have kept the PN in dark. But equally kept in the dark was the inquisitive segment of the electorate who was seeking Labour’s guidance on the issue and who were totally confused when Labour gave its three option vote for the referendum. Clearly the objective was to fudge the referendum result which became clearly predictable, and so postpone judgement for the election and thus make the strategic bundling mistake that I mentioned previously.
The Stupid mistake was the very acceptance to participate in a referendum just before the election when this was a tool of partisan politics to weaken Labour further then they chose to do for themselves when they opted to bundle the EU issue with the election issue. A referendum just before an election gives a very detailed view of the element of disgruntlement amongst PN voters and affords the government the facility to address this disgruntlement with clinical precision using taxpayers’ funds.
Strategically, tactically and rationally Labour did their best to ensure that the wheels of democratic alternation of power stop functioning and condemn themselves to an unduly long term in opposition. This forces Labour to regularly repeal old policies which they have no opportunity to execute through government, and adopt diametrically opposed new ones as new realities make old choices out-dated and unrealistic. This to the chagrin of those who are not prepared to accept new realities and prefer to continue living in the past rather than demand a proper account of why Labour gave a walk-over to the PN at last election.
The political situation inMalta
So even whilst I had every opportunity to gain access to the analysis I refused to read it under these conditions. Still I can make my own analysis and assessment of why Labour lost and I put the reasons under three categories: strategic errors, tactical errors and stupid errors.
The Strategic Error was Labour’s insensible insistence that the EU issue had to be bundled with the election issue and that a referendum was unnecessary and unbinding. It is easy to point out that in January 2001 the general conference had decided to proceed accordingly. But it does well to remember that at the time the working assumption was that EU membership would be wrapped during the then current legislature and the motivation for Labour to insist that the issue be decided through an election was meant for Labour to have a chance to be in government before the issue is decided because it was clear that it would be pretty difficult for Labour to win a referendum organised by a PN government who could not be trusted to make it a level playing field for the yes and no.
The moment it became clear that execution of the EU membership project had slipped into the next legislature, Labour’s interest was to demand the separation of the EU issue from the election and for a binding referendum to be held within a very tight schedule after the election to respect the EU accession calendar. Labour did in fact belatedly switch strategy on these lines but inexplicably shot itself in the brain by incredibly demanding a 60 per cent threshold for the referendum to be binding. This gave full justification to the Prime Minister to proceed with a calendar of events which perfectly suited the PN’s interest without alienating public opinion as Labour managed to do with the 60 per cent condition.
So Labour placed themselves in the strategically destructive position where the more convincingly they criticised the government for weaknesses on the domestic front, the more they strengthened the case for EU membership and weakened Labour’s own bid for winning the election when it was clear that, by Labour’s own choice, the EU issue would gain supremacy in voters’ mind over domestic issues.
Tactically Labour messed up the referendum issue even once they decided upon it. In politics to succeed you need to make the right choices and to make them on time. Whilst in voters’ mind there was no doubt where the government stood on the referendum issue, Labour’s obsession not to disclose their position on the issue prior to the publication of the writ could have kept the PN in dark. But equally kept in the dark was the inquisitive segment of the electorate who was seeking Labour’s guidance on the issue and who were totally confused when Labour gave its three option vote for the referendum. Clearly the objective was to fudge the referendum result which became clearly predictable, and so postpone judgement for the election and thus make the strategic bundling mistake that I mentioned previously.
The Stupid mistake was the very acceptance to participate in a referendum just before the election when this was a tool of partisan politics to weaken Labour further then they chose to do for themselves when they opted to bundle the EU issue with the election issue. A referendum just before an election gives a very detailed view of the element of disgruntlement amongst PN voters and affords the government the facility to address this disgruntlement with clinical precision using taxpayers’ funds.
Strategically, tactically and rationally Labour did their best to ensure that the wheels of democratic alternation of power stop functioning and condemn themselves to an unduly long term in opposition. This forces Labour to regularly repeal old policies which they have no opportunity to execute through government, and adopt diametrically opposed new ones as new realities make old choices out-dated and unrealistic. This to the chagrin of those who are not prepared to accept new realities and prefer to continue living in the past rather than demand a proper account of why Labour gave a walk-over to the PN at last election.
The political situation in
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